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3 The Relationship Between Apolipoprotein-E4 Genotype, Memory, and the Medial Temporal Lobe and How These Relationships Vary by Race in Middle-Aged Persons with HIV
- Laura M Campbell, Maulika Kohli, Erin E Sundermann, Christine Fennema-Notestine, Averi Barrett, Cinnamon Bloss, Mark W Bondi, David B Clifford, Ronald J Ellis, Donald Franklin, Benjamin Gelman, Igor Grant, Robert K Heaton, Scott Letendre, Payal B Patel, David J Moore, Susan Morgello, Raeanne C Moore
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- Journal:
- Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society / Volume 29 / Issue s1 / November 2023
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 21 December 2023, pp. 683-684
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Objective:
Many people with HIV (PWH) are at risk for age-related neurodegenerative disorders such as Alzheimer’s disease (AD). Studies on the association between cognition, neuroimaging outcomes, and the Apolipoprotein E4 (APOE4) genotype, which is associated with greater risk of AD, have yielded mixed results in PWH; however, many of these studies have examined a wide age range of PWH and have not examined APOE by race interactions that are observed in HIV-negative older adults. Thus, we examined how APOE status relates to cognition and medial temporal lobe (MTL) structures (implicated in AD pathogenesis) in mid- to older-aged PWH. In exploratory analyses, we also examined race (African American (AA)/Black and non-Hispanic (NH) White) by APOE status interactions on cognition and MTL structures.
Participants and Methods:The analysis included 88 PWH between the ages of 45 and 68 (mean age=51±5.9 years; 86% male; 51% AA/Black, 38% NH-White, 9% Hispanic/Latinx, 2% other) from the CNS HIV Antiretroviral Therapy Effects Research multi-site study. Participants underwent APOE genotyping, neuropsychological testing, and structural MRI; APOE groups were defined as APOE4+ (at least one APOE4 allele) and APOE4- (no APOE4 alleles). Eighty-nine percent of participants were on antiretroviral therapy, 74% had undetectable plasma HIV RNA (<50 copies/ml), and 25% were APOE4+ (32% AA/Black/15% NH-White). Neuropsychological testing assessed seven domains, and demographically-corrected T-scores were calculated. FreeSurfer 7.1.1 was used to measure MTL structures (hippocampal volume, entorhinal cortex thickness, and parahippocampal thickness) and the effect of scanner was regressed out prior to analyses. Multivariable linear regressions tested the association between APOE status and cognitive and imaging outcomes. Models examining cognition covaried for comorbid conditions and HIV disease characteristics related to global cognition (i.e., AIDS status, lifetime methamphetamine use disorder). Models examining the MTL covaried for age, sex, and
relevant imaging covariates (i.e., intracranial volume or mean cortical thickness).
Results:APOE4+ carriers had worse learning (ß=-0.27, p=.01) and delayed recall (ß=-0.25, p=.02) compared to the APOE4- group, but APOE status was not significantly associated with any other domain (ps>0.24). APOE4+ status was also associated with thinner entorhinal cortex (ß=-0.24, p=.02). APOE status was not significantly associated with hippocampal volume (ß=-0.08, p=0.32) or parahippocampal thickness (ß=-0.18, p=.08). Lastly, race interacted with APOE status such that the negative association between APOE4+ status and cognition was stronger in NH-White PWH as compared to AA/Black PWH in learning, delayed recall, and verbal fluency (ps<0.05). There were no APOE by race interactions for any MTL structures (ps>0.10).
Conclusions:Findings suggest that APOE4 carrier status is associated with worse episodic memory and thinner entorhinal cortex in mid- to older-aged PWH. While APOE4+ groups were small, we found that APOE4 carrier status had a larger association with cognition in NH-White PWH as compared to AA/Black PWH, consistent with studies demonstrating an attenuated effect of APOE4 in older AA/Black HIV-negative older adults. These findings further highlight the importance of recruiting diverse samples and suggest exploring other genetic markers (e.g., ABCA7) that may be more predictive of AD in some races to better understand AD risk in diverse groups of PWH.
Developing relevant assessments of community-engaged research partnerships: A community-based participatory approach to evaluating clinical and health research study teams
- Elias Samuels, Donald Vereen, Patricia Piechowski, Athena McKay, E. Hill De Loney, Sarah Bailey, Luther Evans, Bettina Campbell, Yvonne Lewis, Ella Greene-Moton, Kent Key, DeWaun Robinson, Arlene Sparks, Ellen Champagne, Susan Woolford
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- Journal of Clinical and Translational Science / Volume 7 / Issue 1 / 2023
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 11 May 2023, e123
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Background/Objective:
In 2017, the Michigan Institute for Clinical and Health Research (MICHR) and community partners in Flint, Michigan collaborated to launch a research funding program and evaluate the dynamics of those research partnerships receiving funding. While validated assessments for community-engaged research (CEnR) partnerships were available, the study team found none sufficiently relevant to conducting CEnR in the context of the work. MICHR faculty and staff along with community partners living and working in Flint used a community-based participatory research (CBPR) approach to develop and administer a locally relevant assessment of CEnR partnerships that were active in Flint in 2019 and 2021.
Methods:Surveys were administered each year to over a dozen partnerships funded by MICHR to evaluate how community and academic partners assessed the dynamics and impact of their study teams over time.
Results:The results suggest that partners believed that their partnerships were engaging and highly impactful. Although many substantive differences between community and academic partners’ perceptions over time were identified, the most notable regarded the financial management of the partnerships.
Conclusion:This work contributes to the field of translational science by evaluating how the financial management of community-engaged health research partnerships in a locally relevant context of Flint can be associated with these teams’ scientific productivity and impact with national implications for CEnR. This work presents evaluation methods which can be used by clinical and translational research centers that strive to implement and measure their use of CBPR approaches.
6 - Auctions
- Donald E. Campbell, College of William and Mary, Virginia
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- Incentives
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- 06 August 2018
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- 22 February 2018, pp 357-422
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Summary
Auctions have been used for more than 2,500 years to allocate a single indivisible asset. They are also used to sell multiple units of some commodities, such as rare wine or a new crop of tulip bulbs. There are many different types of auctions in use, and far more that have never been tried but could be employed if we felt that they served some purpose. The aim of this chapter is to determine which type of auction should be used in a particular situation. Accordingly, we need to determine which bidder would get the asset that is up for sale and then howmuch would be paid for it.
INTRODUCTION
When the government sells things at auction – treasury bills, oil-drilling rights, or a TV broadcast frequency, for instance – the appropriate criterion for determining which type of auction should be used is the maximization of general consumer welfare. Because the bidders are usually firms, we recommend the auction type that would put the asset in the hands of the firm that would use it to produce the highest level of consumer welfare. Fortunately, this is correlated with the value of the asset to a bidder: the more valuable the asset is to consumers when it is used by firm X, themore profit X anticipates from owning the asset, and thus the higher the value that X itself places on the asset. (Section 6.1.2 explains why revenue net of cost is a good measure of the benefit that consumers derive from a firm's activities.) The discounted stream of profits that would flow from the asset is the individual firm's reservation value, and it is a hidden characteristic. If the government were to ask each firm to report its reservation value and awarded the asset to the high-value firm it would get nothing resembling truthful revelation. Each would have a strong incentive to overstate the value it places on the asset in an attempt to increase the probability of being awarded the asset.
Subject Index
- Donald E. Campbell, College of William and Mary, Virginia
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- 22 February 2018, pp 678-685
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8 - Public Goods and Preference Revelation
- Donald E. Campbell, College of William and Mary, Virginia
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- 22 February 2018, pp 459-503
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Summary
This chapter investigates preference revelation in a standard economicmodel. There is a commodity that can be consumed jointly and simultaneously by the entire community – a fireworks display, for instance. To produce this public good, resources have to be diverted from the production of commodities for private consumption. In ourmodel, as in the real world, efficiency requires a positive amount of some public good to be produced. But there is a point beyond which an increase in the supply of the public good leads to an inefficient outcome. Clearly, identification of an efficient outcome depends on individuals revealing their preferences. In this context truthful revelation of individual preference is problematic because one can consume the public good without contributing to the financing of it.
More generally, agent A's action generates a positive spillover if some other agent B directly benefits as a result of that action. For example, if A removes weeds from his own property, then neighbor B's grass will have fewer weeds because one source of seed has been eliminated. In this case, most of the benefit of A's effort is reaped by A, so we say that the spillover is incomplete. However, if C produces a fireworks display then everyone else in town will have just as good a view of it as C and hence the spillover is complete. When the agent creating the spillover benefit is not compensated for the positive effect on the welfare of others, we refer to it as an externality. Important examples include the containment of a virulent disease by a health organization, the retardation of global warming or ozone depletion by international treaty, and publication of information concerning public safety.
Our aim is to provide the individual decision maker with incentive to consider the benefit that others derive from his or her actions. The decision maker can be a single individual or household, or a region within a country, or even a country itself. When one country takes costly measures to reduce its output of carbon dioxide any resulting retardation of global warming is a benefit that is captured by every country.
5 - Hidden Characteristics
- Donald E. Campbell, College of William and Mary, Virginia
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- 22 February 2018, pp 284-356
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Summary
This chapter and the next four investigate hidden characteristic problems, from voting to used-car markets to kidney exchanges. In some cases market forces have fostered contracts and other devices that induce agents to reveal their hidden characteristics. This does not mean that the equilibrium outcome is efficient in each case, however. There are incentive schemes that do induce truthful revelation of the hidden information while at the same time bringing the system close to efficiency – the Vickrey auction of Chapter 6 for instance.
Markets can be very creative in circumventing hidden information problems – for instance, warranties on consumer durables. The producer of a shoddy appliance cannot afford to offer a substantial warranty: the point of producing a low-quality item is to get more profit by keeping costs down, but if appliances are being returned for replacement or repair then costs will be high, not low. A producer who deliberately sets out to profit by misleading consumers about the quality of the product will not be able to offer the same kind of warranty as the producer of a high-quality product. The latter is credibly signaling high quality to the consumer by offering a substantial warranty. Reputable manufacturers often make good on a warranty even after it has expired, as long as the appliance is returned a month or less after the expiration date.
Although not always delivering an efficient outcome, the market system often goes a long way toward eliciting the hidden information. The next section begins with a standard example of the hidden characteristic phenomenon.
It can be in society's interest to have the hidden information remain hidden. It is often essential for communication about financial transactions to be encoded so that eavesdroppers cannot profit fromthe information. Electronic messages are encoded using an asymmetric form of encryption: the recipient R of the message publishes the key to encoding the text that R will receive. This key is the product of two very large prime numbers p and q. But only the product is published. To decode the message it is necessary to know both p and q, and only R knows these prime factors. If they are sufficiently large, it will be well beyond the ability of even a huge network of computers to determine them in anyone's lifetime, even though the product is known.
10 - Networks
- Donald E. Campbell, College of William and Mary, Virginia
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- 22 February 2018, pp 570-602
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Summary
Networks can be tiny – your circle of very close friends, for instance. They can be vast, as in the case of the individuals and institutions connected to you and to each other through the world wide web. The internet has not only given us an extraordinary increase in the number of sources from which we can obtain information. It has also increased the value of that information, in part because of the great increase in the number of sources of information available to the compilers of any web site that you visit. (Of course, the web has also greatly increased the number of sources of misinformation.) Until the arrival of the internet, an increase in the number of sources of information brought with it a substantial increase in the cost of widespread comparison shopping: one had to sacrifice a significant amount of time to visit rival retailers. By contrast, the web has vastly reduced the cost of acquiring information from any one source, and thus has made it possible to comparison shop extensively at almost no cost. (Transactions involving rare books have increased more than a hundred-fold since the advent of the internet, because search costs have virtually dropped to zero. In the previous century collectors of rare books had to wait for the arrival of annual catalogues. These catalogues were costly and infrequently updated because of the cost and the time commitment required of their compilers.)
Nathan Rothschild added millions to his fortune when the news of Wellington's victory over Napoleon at Waterloo reached him, via carrier pigeon, before any other stock trader (Malkiel, 2003, p. 196). The installation of a telegraph cable on the ocean floor in the nineteenth century allowed London to communicate with Australia in four days. It had taken seventy days by surface mail (Fulcher, 2004, pp. 82–83).
The internet may be the network that comes to mind first, but it is probably not the most important one. That is obviously the case in parts of the third world where there is no access to the web. Instead, networks that rely on information transmission by word-of-mouth are used to locate sources of safe drinking water, to provide access to birth control information, and for AIDS prevention campaigns, to name but a few crucial examples.
References
- Donald E. Campbell, College of William and Mary, Virginia
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- 22 February 2018, pp 654-672
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Contents
- Donald E. Campbell, College of William and Mary, Virginia
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Dedication
- Donald E. Campbell, College of William and Mary, Virginia
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1 - Equilibrium, Efficiency, and Asymmetric Information
- Donald E. Campbell, College of William and Mary, Virginia
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- 22 February 2018, pp 1-70
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9 - Matching
- Donald E. Campbell, College of William and Mary, Virginia
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- 22 February 2018, pp 504-569
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Summary
This chapter examines allocation problems for which the desired “commodities”, such as dormitory rooms, are only available in discrete units and each “consumer” wants one unit and only one unit. Moreover, allocating a desired object to the highest bidder is unacceptable, as it would be in the case of an offer of admission to a good university. The objective is to match each student with a room (or a university), or available kidneys with the patients on a transplant waiting list, and so forth.
Suppose that an economics department has a given number of students (i.e., majors) and professors, and the objective is to assign each student a professoradvisor. In this case both sides of the match have preferences: students like some professors better than others, and the professors can rank the students. There are problems for which only one side of the match has preferences: students have preferences for dormitory rooms, but the rooms don't have preferences for students.
We can also classify matching problems according to whether we can have outcomes at which an agent is paired with more than one agent of the opposite type, as in the case of college admissions. Each student is placed with only one college, but each college admits many students. Both types have preferences: each student can rank the colleges, and the colleges have preferences for students – if only for students with high test scores.
The first allocation problem that we study is a marriage model, for which there are two types of agents: there is a set ofWtypes and a set ofMtypes. Each member of each type has a preference ordering for the members of the other type, and each agent is matched with at most one member of the other type. The problem of matching students and advisors can be a marriage model. A student will have at most only one advisor, and if there is a department rule limiting a professor to at most one advisee then we have a marriage model. Our objective is not to classify allocation problems, however, but to solve them by designing satisfactory allocation procedures.
Author Index
- Donald E. Campbell, College of William and Mary, Virginia
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- 22 February 2018, pp 673-677
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11 - General Competitive Equilibrium
- Donald E. Campbell, College of William and Mary, Virginia
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- 22 February 2018, pp 603-653
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Summary
This chapter takes an economy-wide perspective and seeks a mechanism that elicits private information about individual preferences and firm production recipes to deliver an efficient allocation of private goods and services. We assume away all other hidden information problems. In particular, every consumer is assumed to know the quality of every firm's output, every employer knows the abilities of every prospective employee, every lender knows the probability of default of every creditor, and so on. Every manager can be relied on to maximize profit. In fact there is no shirking by anyone.
The economy faces an impressive challenge – to induce truthful revelation of the remaining hidden information, specifically preferences and production functions. In fact, three of the five sections even assume away this hidden information problem, highlighting instead the transmission of information. Recall that an outcome is efficient if there is no other arrangement of production and consumption activities that makes one person better off without lowering the utility of anyone else. Identification of an efficient outcome would seem to require an enormous amount of information about all of the private characteristics. Therefore, even with most of the hidden information problems assumed away, identification of an efficient outcome by the market system is a remarkable accomplishment. Social cost pricing is the key.
In a private ownership market economy the consumer maximizes utility subject to a budget constraint, and this results in a chosen consumption plan at which the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) for each pair of commodities equals the price ratio for those goods. Therefore, the price ratio transmits information about one consumer's MRS to every other consumer and every firm. The budget constraint gives consumers the incentive to employ that information in their utility maximization calculations, as Section 11.1.4 demonstrates. Profit maximization by a firm in a competitive environment results in the equilibrium price of a commodity that is also equal to the marginal cost of producing that good. Therefore, prices transmit marginal information about consumer preferences and firm production recipes.
In spite of the fact that prices transmit only marginal information, we demonstrate in Sections 11.2 and 11.3 that this allows an efficient outcome to be identified in a wide range of circumstances.
Frontmatter
- Donald E. Campbell, College of William and Mary, Virginia
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Incentives
- Motivation and the Economics of Information
- 3rd edition
- Donald E. Campbell
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- 22 February 2018
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When incentives work well, individuals prosper. When incentives are poor, the pursuit of self-interest is self-defeating. This book is wholly devoted to the topical subject of incentives from individual, collective, and institutional standpoints. This third edition is fully updated and expanded, including a new section on the 2007–08 financial crisis and a new chapter on networks as well as specific applications of school placement for students, search engine ad auctions, pollution permits, and more. Using worked examples and lucid general theory in its analysis, and seasoned with references to current and past events, Incentives: Motivation and the Economics of Information examines: the performance of agents hired to carry out specific tasks, from taxi drivers to CEOs; the performance of institutions, from voting schemes to medical panels deciding who gets kidney transplants; a wide range of market transactions, from auctions to labor markets to the entire economy. Suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate students studying incentives as part of courses in microeconomics, economic theory, managerial economics, political economy, and related areas of social science.
Preface to the Third Edition
- Donald E. Campbell, College of William and Mary, Virginia
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- 22 February 2018, pp xi-xii
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Summary
My greatest debt is to Emily Martell, an undergraduate at William and Mary. She was my research assistant for the last eight months of work on the book. Her love of learning, her ability to write good prose, and her extraordinary intellect redounded to my great benefit and to the benefit of anyone who reads this book. Emily contributed to a few of the topics – the Enron debacle among them – and read the new network chapter and some others, each with great care. She responded to requests for help with alacrity and skill. Both her research and her critique of the manuscript were exemplary. She not only identified glitches, she drew my attention to passages that were not sufficiently clear. (“Glitch” is an understatement. She saved me from a horrible blunder in Chapter 4.) Emily even corrected my prose. I am deeply grateful for her help, and blessed to have had her as a colleague. Any defects that remain can be put down to the fact that I did not give her enough time to read the entire manuscript.
I am also thankful for the input of Steven Williams of the Department of Economics, University of Illinois, Lauren Merrill of the Boston Consulting Group, and my longtime colleague Jerry Kelly.
Over the last eight years I have benefitted from the excellent research assistance of Jennifer Boardman, Anthony Guth, Sarah Turner, and Gefoffrey Zinden. They were students in William and Mary's Masters in Public Policy program and my research assistants during their time here. The fruits of their labor can be found in the gray boxes containing the snippets that complement the formal analysis.
A number of William and Mary undergraduates have contributed to the third edition by suggesting improvements to its predecessor. I'm happy to be able to publicly thank Fasil Alemante, Daniel Byler, Bryan Callaway, Jimmy Cao, Sarah Gault, You-Suk Kim, Shane Mangin, Ruoyan Sun, Richard Uhrig, and especially Theresa Long. I'malso grateful to Simon Fung who, as a student at the University of London, drew my attention to an error in the second edition.
I salute my Cambridge University Press editors, Karen Maloney and Stephen Acerra, and editorial assistant Kristina Deusch. Their encouragement and guidance are much appreciated.
7 - Voting and Preference Revelation
- Donald E. Campbell, College of William and Mary, Virginia
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- 22 February 2018, pp 423-458
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Summary
This chapter examines decision making by a community (or any group) in a simple model: the community must choose from a finite set of mutually exclusive alternatives. (The next chapter endows the model with much more structure by specifying individual utility functions and a production function – and resource constraints. The utility functions will have classical economic properties.)
We look at situations in which a groupmust make a decision that will be binding on all of its members. For example, a class has to determine a time for a review session, a town has to decide whether to build a new school, a nation has to elect a legislature. The resulting choice will have no other implications for personal consumption – in this chapter. Suppose for instance that X, Y, Z, etc. denote alternative ways of spending a fixed amount of government revenue, with the same individual tax burdens in each case. In this setting we can't rule out any ranking of the available options as a possible preference scheme for a member of the group. This makes it very difficult to induce truthful revelation of the hidden characteristic, which in this chapter and the next is the individual's true preference scheme. We want the individuals to reveal enough information about their preferences to enable the system to select the outcome that best reflects those individual preferences.
Clearly, one could write an entire book on the criteria for determining the alternative that “best” reflects individual preferences. Indeed, hundreds of volumes have been written on that theme. In this chapter we set that issue aside and simply determine which selection rules elicit truthful information about individual preferences. Aselection rule is essentially amapping from individual preferences into a social choice, and it must be defined for each possible specification of individual preferences.
VOTING RULES
Although this section examines voting procedures, you are encouraged to think of the candidates standing for election not as individuals seeking careers in government but as alternative packages of public projects. Candidate (or alternative) X may, for example, be a proposal to reduce expenditure on space exploration by a specific amount and to use the proceeds to fund research on the production of energy by nuclear fusion.
4 - Corporate Governance
- Donald E. Campbell, College of William and Mary, Virginia
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- 22 February 2018, pp 219-283
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Summary
This chapter investigates incentives in firms. We explore the hidden action problems of a modern corporation. Section 4.1 compares firms in several leading industrialized countries. Section 4.2 examines the relationship between two senior executives who share the firm's profits and is followed by a brief look at the relationship between the owner and employees in an owner-managed firm (Section 4.3). The rest of the chapter is devoted to the hidden action problem confronting a widely dispersed group of shareholders whose objective is to have the firm that they jointly own maximize the value of their shares. Can they rely on the board of directors to provide the appropriate incentives to the company's management team, even though it is extremely costly for the shareholders to monitor the management and the board members as well?
A BRIEF TOUR OF SEVERAL COUNTRIES
We are primarily concerned with the attempt of a firm's owners to obtain a satisfactory return on the capital they supply to the firm. The owners provide financing when they purchase shares in the firm. They also contribute passively every time the firm uses retained earnings to purchase equipment. Firms also borrow financial capital, and in many industrialized countries bank loans are a much more important source of finance than in the United States. All the suppliers of finance want management to function in a way that brings them a high return. However, a chief executive may act in a way that benefits himself or herself at the expense of the suppliers of capital. We refer to this as the agency problem.
DEFINITION: The Modern Corporation's Agency Problem
The firm's owners and creditors seek a high return on their investments but the daily decisions that determine that rate of return are made by the firm'smanagement team, and themanagersmay be assumed to have their own welfare at heart.
One striking difference between the pattern of ownership across countries lies in the role of the financial sector. US banks were prohibited from holding equity in corporations until the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999.
2 - Basic Models and Tools
- Donald E. Campbell, College of William and Mary, Virginia
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- 22 February 2018, pp 71-147
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